Elections and Events 1990-1993


Barrig 1998:  "Apart from spiraling poverty and cholera, the early 1990s brought Shining Path even closer to the center stage in Peruvian politics...The rise of Shining Path had to do with Peru's profound social, economic, and racial fractures...(I)ts development is an important factor in interpreting women's political mobilization over the past decade, which has occurred around two radically different proposals:  the collective survival movements of urban poor women on the one hand, and militancy around a leader, Abimael Guzmán, Shining Path's number one, on the other, who demanded that his followers destroy the state to build a new society" (pages 104-105).

Burt 2007:  "By 1990, 32 percent of the territory and 49 percent of the population was under military control" (page 67).  "By 1990, Peru was on the verge of collapse, with political parties on the run and civil society severely fragmented.  In the wake of the collapse of organized politics and the dramatic decline of public authority, two deeply authoritarian political projects flourished:  the Shining Path guerrilla movement and the neoliberal authoritarianism of Alberto Fujimori" (page 87).

Clayton 1999:  "Fujimori rallied the Pentecostal Protestant support very effectively.  His running mate for second vice president was Carlos García García, a Baptist preacher and president of the National Evangelical Council of Peru.  More than 25 percent of Fujimori's party's (Cambio 90) congressional slate were either ministers or members of a Protestant sect...The association between the Pentecostals and the U.S. religious right certainly reinforced the tendency of the first Fujimori administration to favor the conservative political and economic trajectory that it took" (page 292).

Conaghan 2005:  "Fujimori launched his 1990 presidential bid in conjunction with his campaign for a senate seat.  At the time, Peru's election law permitted candidates to run for both offices simultaneously.  Running for president was generally thought to boost a candidate's notoriety, thus making it easier to win the congressional seat...Fifty of the 240 congressional candidates fielded by Fujimori's organization Cambio 90 (C90) were evangelical church members.  One of his two vice-presidential running mates, Carlos García, was an evangelical minister" (page 17).

Conaghan 2005:  "Facing war [against Sendero] and economic collapse, Peruvian voters were desperate for a change.  As Fujimori's campaign gathered steam, other candidates faltered...Vargas Llosa...alienated voters with lavish spending and saturation advertising.  The APRA candidate, Luis Alva Castro, suffered by virtue of his association with outgoing President Alan García.  On the left, voters were divided as the Izquierda Unida (IU) coalition split into separate wings.  Desperate to defeat Vargas Llosa, a man who had caused him so much grief in 1987, President García looked for an alternative.  He found one in the man whom he had put on public television" (page 18).

Cotler 1993:  "(J)ust when Vargas Llosa's electoral success began to be taken as a given and predicted in the public opinion polls, there was an unexpected reaction.  APRA and the Left called attention to Vargas Llosa's radical neoliberal pronouncements...The unconcealed association of Vargas Llosa and his retinue with the ‘rich,' his reiterated and virulent attacks on his opponents and, in general, on those who did not align themselves with his platform as the only definitive solution to the problems of Perú and the world generated a sudden reaction against him...The beneficiary was Alberto Fujimori, an obscure politician who led CAMBIO 90...Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, had the support of the Protestant church, and he caused a political commotion that was not devoid of racist statements and religious animosities" (page 221).

García Montero 2001:  "(E)n 1990, con el fracaso de todos los partidos conocidos, la confianza ciudadana fue depositada en dos figuras desconocidas, hasta ese momento, en la política:  un novelista con propuestas liberales y fuerte apoyo del ‘establishment' (Mario Vargas Llosa) y un desconocido profesor universitario sin programa ni bases políticas y con una fuerte campaña de rechazo a toda la elite política nacional, Alberto Fujimori.  Este apoyo fue, en parte, motivado por los propios partidos que, en muchos casos, no supieron (o no pudieron) generar respuestas a las demandas y problemas de la sociedad" (page 412). 

Hinojosa 1998:  "At the beginning of the 1990s, to speak of the radical Peruvian Left was to refer to Shining Path.  In effect, Shining Path had taken over the political space of Marxist organizations that had, until a short time before, proposed armed struggle as the effective path to power, distrusted representative democracy as an end in itself, and affirmed the necessity of destroying the state and the armed forces in order to construct socialism" (page 61).

Levitt 2002:  "The APRA's presidential campaign was quite different in 1990 than in 1985; an uncharismatic party man fighting an uphill battle against the poor performance of his party in government was a far cry from the momentum of García's campaign.  But congressional candidacies for the 1990 elections were organized along lines similar to the 1985 campaign, with internal elections across the country that were then reordered by the Departmental Committees and the party's National Executive Committee in Lima" (page 129).

Mayorga 2006:  "During the 1980s, high electoral volatility and a high degree of polarization and confrontation characterized the Peruvian party system.  The electoral campaign of 1990 was no exception.  Vargas Llosa polarized the electoral contest mainly because of his proposed economic shock program, prompting the APRA government and leftist parties to make him the main target of their attacks" (page 142).

Palmer 2004:  "The 1990 national elections represented a major turning point in Peruvian politics.  Disillusioned by the havoc wreaked over ten years of drmatically ineffective party politics, Peruvians turned to nonparty alternatives, namely Mario Vargas Llosa and Alberto Fujimori, whose signal distinction was that, as a leading novelist and a university president, neither had any political experience or political party identification" (page 98).

Radu 1990:  "The overwhelming majority of Peruvians perceive the April elections as one of the most critical in the history of the country...Beyond immediate campaign issues, these elections may also delineate the future of Peruvian politics.  Dramatic economic decay, international isolation and vicious internal war, combined with narcotics production and trafficking issues have led to the perception that unless these elections result in a dramatic change, civilian rule is doomed.  It is conceivable that if such change does not occur, the military, despite its stated and felt wishes, will be forced to step in" (volume 1 page 1).

Tanaka 2006:  "The division of the left, FREDEMO's internal problems and the extreme ideologization of its campaign, and the weakness of an APRA candidate who had to assume the costs of the failures of García's administration without receiving the benefits of support from the top...created a vacuum of representation.  The political center, having been left more or less vacant, was subsequently occupied by a candidate who had not even been mentioned in the surveys until a few weeks before the election.  From among the group of ‘minor' candidates, Alberto Fujimori...suddenly turned out to be an attractive option.  Once Fujimori began to rise in the opinion polls, García began to support him through his connections in the press, and his support was decisive" (page 55).

Tuesta Soldevilla 1994:  "Gastos en televisión en Lima:  campaña presidencial 1990" (page 26).  "Inversión publicitaria para la campaña presidencial y parlamentaria 1990" (page 26).

Vargas 1994:  "Although the women's movement did not field its own candidates, it did manage to generate an important space during the campaign:  the Foro Mujer (Women's Forum), which was created as a committee by various feminist organizations to encourage formulation of policies that favor women.  The Women's Forum sent an open letter to all the presidential candidates, urging them to incorporate women's interests into their agendas" (page 587).


Mayorga 2006:  "President García turned his back on his own party's candidate, Alva Castro, deciding two months before the election to support the unknown Fujimori instead.  Thus, Fujimori obtained strong government backing" (page 142).


Conaghan 2005:  "It took some time for the media to take notice of Alberto Fujimori.  Until his surprising surge in the polls just a month before the first round of the presidential election in April 1990, Fujimori was a nonentity.  The media darling of the 1990 race was Mario Vargas Llosa, the urbane, internationally acclaimed author...[Fujimori] had never run for office before...But Fujimori's career ascent was...by no means a vault from total obscurity.  Fujimori had spent years cultivating his connections with the ruling party [APRA], and President Alan García" (pages 16-17).

Crabtree 1992:  "Up to two or three weeks before the first round, the Fujimori ‘phenomenon' had gone virtually undetected...But in those two weeks the name of Alberto Fujimori and that of his campaign organization, Cambio-90, spread like wildfire, reflecting an extraordinary political vacuum" (page 178).

Fleet 1997:  "(T)he fact that evangelical Protestants held important positions in his Cambio 90 movement, and were actively promoting his candidacy, was of considerable concern to bishops already alarmed at the recent growth enjoyed by Protestant denominations in Peru" (page  252).

García Montero 2001:  "En 1990, ante el enorme fracaso del APRA, el descrédito de los partidos tradicionales y la atomización de la izquierda, Mario Vargas Llosa, el candidato de la coalición Frente Democrático (FREDEMO), era considerado el seguro ganador por las encuestas tres semanas antes de realizarse las elecciones presidenciales del 8 de abril de 1990.  Vargas Llosa parecía tenerlo todo...Nadie imaginaba que un candidato ‘sin opciones', aún más desconocido y ajeno al sistema político, podría derrotar al notorio candidato de FREDEMO" (page 455).

Graham 1992:  "Until one month prior to the April 8, 1990, first round of elections, FREDEMO was favored to win easily...This support was due largely to the general discrediting of APRA.  The widespread perception of a FREDEMO victory resulted in its running a heavy-handed and extremely ideological campaign...This, coupled with the split of Izquierda Unida, opened the door for the sudden and surprising growth of support for Alberto Fujimori in March 1990" (page 151).  Gives details.

Keesing's record of world events April 1990:  "A state of emergency, which already existed over two-thirds of the country (representing more than 50 per cent of the population), had been reimposed for 30 days in the capital Lima on March 23 in an effort to protect candidates, following the murder of a FREDEMO congressional candidate" (electronic edition).  Discusses other recent political murders.

McClintock 1998:  "In March 1990, the...(Grupo Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN),...was formed within the antiterrorist police unit...(Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo, DINCOTE)" (pages 144-145).

April 8:  general election

Chávez López 2002:  Discusses the 1990 election (page 114).

Conaghan 2000:  "The internal rivalries within the FREDEMO resurfaced during the 1990 congressional election as candidates from AP, the PPC, SODE, and the ML poured money into their individual congressional campaigns.  The rules governing the congressional election allowed voters to cast a preferential ballot for an individual candidate within each party's own closed list.  The preferential vote created incentives for intense interparty competition and spending.  The result was a congressional race notable both for lavish spending by FREDEMO candidates and for the alienating effect this conduct had on voters" (page 263).

Conaghan 2005:  "Fujimori won 24.6 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election, less than three percentage points behind Vargas Llosa, who took 27.6 percent of the vote.  The APRA candidate, Luis Alva Castro, trailed with 19 percent.  Fujimori...won strong pluralities in Lima's shantytowns and in working-class neighborhoods.  In contrast, Vargas Llosa's strongest showings were in voting districts where the upper and middle classes resided.  Fujimori's strong second place not only assured him a spot in the second-round runoff, it turned him into the presumptive winner" (pages 18-19).

Cotler 1993:  "The results of the elections demonstrated beyond a doubt the fragmented character of...Vargas Llosa's public support and the speed with which political identities can change.  The rich (‘white'), who were traditionally associated with AP and PPC and had received the endorsement of the Catholic hierarchy, voted for Vargas Llosa; the poor, the migrants, the informal-sector workers and the peasants voted for Fujimori" (page 221).

Crabtree 1992:  "(T)he scale of the Fujimori vote on 8 April took everyone by surprise.  Excluding null and void votes, he got 24 per cent of the vote to Vargas Llosa's 29 per cent.  In contrast, APRA got 20 per cent and the left-its two factions combined-a meager 11 per cent...The result was more the consequence of very exceptional political circumstances than of Fujimori's own qualities, strong though these may have been" (page 179).  Gives details.  "For the left the 1990 election results were a humiliating setback.  Compared with 25 percent of the vote in 1985 and 30 per cent in the 1986 municipal elections, the 11 per cent it received in 1990 was its lowest level since the Izquierda Unida came into existence in 1980" (page 181).

Dean 2002:  "Following the tumultuous events of the 1980s, and the failed economic policies of Alan García Pérez's presidency (1985-1990), many Peruvians turned to a political ‘outsider' to solve the country's record rates of joblessness, inflation, monumental fiscal deficit, and grinding poverty...[Fujimori's] independent political party emerged from total obscurity to defeat Vargas Llosa, a political favorite backed by the patrician old guard and Lima-based conservative business elites...The...political system that emerged under Fujimori depended on the time-honored ploy of doling out state resources on the basis of political patronage" (page 202).

Dietz 1998:  The IU losses in the 1985 and 1986 elections "reawakened all of IU's self-destructive tendencies of internal power struggles based on personalities and esoteric ideological arguments, and by 1990 the left took less than 5 percent of the popular presidential vote" (pages 203-204).

García Montero 2001:  "La activa participación de Alan García, a fin de bloquear a su enemigo personal, Vargas Llosa, y al candidato aprista que desafiaba sus intenciones de seguir dirigiendo los destinos del APRA fue fundamental" (page 456).

Graham 1992:  "By the April elections Cambio had 200,000 registered members in its ranks, as well as substantial popular following...In the first round of elections Vargas Llosa attained 28.19 percent of the vote, Fujimori 24.32 percent, APRA 19.57 percent, the IU 7.12 percent, and the ASI 4.16 percent.  Null and blank votes were 14.38 percent of the total.  It was clear from that point on that the left and APRA would back Fujimori if for no other reason than to defeat Vargas Llosa in the second round.  Vargas Llosa was seen as the representative of the traditional conservative elite and was thus unacceptable for ideological reasons if not for pragmatic ones" (page 153).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  8/4:  "Se celebran elecciones generales.  Los candidatos son:  Mario Vargas Llosa (Fredemo), Javier Alva Orlandini (AP), Luis Alva Castro (APRA), Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Henry Pease García Yrigoyen, Alfonso Barrantes Lingán y otros de menor opción" (page 674).

Keesing's record of world events April 1990:  "In presidential elections held on April 8, Mario Vargas Llosa, 54, the internationally acclaimed novelist and canditate of the ‘Democratic Front' (FREDEMO), won 27.61 per cent of the vote but failed to gain the necessary overall majority.  His candidacy thus went forward to a second round run-off scheduled for June 3, in which his opponent would be an unexpected late entrant Alberto Keinya Fujimori, 52, of the newly formed Change 90 (‘Cambio 90') movement who received 24.62 per cent of the vote.  The incumbent President, Alan García Pérez, was barred by electoral law from seeking re-election...Turnout was about 64 per cent of the 10,000,000 people eligible to vote, and of the total votes cast 15.35 per cent were either blank or invalid...(T)he deployment of an estimated 300,000 soldiers and police ensured that polling day passed off relatively peacefully" (electronic edition).  Gives additional information.

Klarén 2000:  "When the vote was finally cast, Fujimori came from seemingly nowhere to garner 25 percent of the ballots, only three points behind Vargas Llosa's 28 percent, with Alva Castro third, at 19 percent, and the combined two candidates of the Left last, at 11 percent.  His remarkable showing was due, in great part, to his having received the lion's share of the vote of the informal sector in the shantytowns...As for the congressional vote, FREDEMO candidates managed to win a plurality of one-third of the seats in both houses of Congress (21 out of 62 senators and 83 of 180 deputies), while APRA won only slightly less than a third (17 senators and 70 deputies)...Fujimori's Cambio 90...won less than a fifth of the seats in Congress (14 senators, and 32 deputies)" (page 404).

Mayorga 2006:  "FREDEMO obtained 32.3 percent in the first round of the presidential election, and 30.1 percent of the seats in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.  APRA obtained 25.1 (presidency) and 21.5 percent (Congress), respectively, while the [IU] obtained 9.8 and 10 percent, and IS...5.5 and 5.3 percent, respectively.  Cambio 90..., Fujimori's movement, became a minority faction in Congress, obtaining only 21.7 percent of Senate seats and 16.5 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies" (page 142).

Planas 2000:  "Elecciones regionales 1990 (Número de representantes por partidos políticos o movimientos)" (page 270).  "Necesaria relectura de las elecciones de 1990" (page 275-345).  Statistics and details of the election.

Radu 1990:  "Participating political parties, coalitions and groupings (in order of appearance on ballot)" (volume 1).  "The April 8 elections will select a president, two vice-presidents and a bicameral national Congress (Chamber of Deputies and Senate).  The Chamber of Deputies has 180 members.  The Senate will have 60 elected members and two senators for life-the two living elected former presidents, Fernando Belaunde Terry and Alan Garcia" (volume 1 page 8).  "(T)he order of listing on the ballot was ultimately decided by compromise.   This ensuing compromise calls for the ballot to be printed on both sides, and reflects the chronological order of political party registration.  In practice, this has led to the somewhat unusual result that two of the four major contenders (the ruling PAP and FREDEMO) are respectively listed next to last and last on the reverse side of an extremely lengthy ballot" (volume 1 page 9).  "The principal contenders" (volume 1 pages 10-18).  "(W)hether the major Peruvian (and foreign) media called it an ‘earthquake' or a ‘tsunami,' the spectacular and unexpected success of the Cambio 90 presidential candidate, Alberto Fujimori, has produced the most important, unexpected, and potentially uncertain electoral result in the history of Peru's democratic elections" (volume 2 page 1).  "Interpreting the results" (volume 2 pages 2-6).  "The campaign and election day" (volume 2 pages 6-10).  "Preliminary presidential and legislative election results" (volume 2 page 14).

Rospigliosi 1992:  Detailed discussion of election.  "Inversión publicitaria en tv en la campaña electoral 1990 (primera vuelta) (En miles de US$)" (page 358).  "Votos nulos y blancos (1a vuelta)" (page 379).  "Total nacional para presidente" (page 383).  "Resultados para el Congreso Nacional (Número y porcentaje de bancas ocupadas por los partidos)" (page 388).

Tanaka 2006:  "In the 1990 elections the left divided, presenting two presidential candidates.  The IU candidate, Henry Pease, polled 8.2 percent of the vote, while Alfonso Barrantes, candidate for the newly created...Izquierda Socialista...won only 4.7 percent" (page 54).  Discusses the results of the elections for the senate and chamber of deputies (page 56).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  "Congreso 1990-1992.  Número de parlamentarios por partido político" (pages 67-68).  "Diputados regionales 1990-1992.  Número de parlamentarios por partido político" (page 68).  "Congreso 1990-1992.  Senadores" (pages 81-82).  Gives "puesto electo," "puesto lista," "apellidos y nombres," "partido," and "voto preferencial."  "Congreso 1990-1992.  Diputados" (pages 83-88).  Gives "puesto electo," "puesto lista," "departamento/Apellidos y nombres," "partido," and "voto preferencial."  "Diputados regionales (1990-1992)" (pages 311-314).  Gives department, name, and party.   "Elecciones generales 1990-primera vuelta.  Resultado nacional" (page 504).  Gives votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."  "Elecciones generales 1990-primera vuelta.  Resultado nacional-senadores" (page 505).  Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."  "Elecciones generales 1990-primera vuelta.  Resultado nacional-diputados" (page 506).  Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."   "Elecciones generales 1990-primera vuelta.  Resultado departamental" (page 507).  Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Elecciones generales 1990-primera vuelta.  Resultado provincial" (pages 508-512).  Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Elecciones generales 1990-primera vuelta.  Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 513-514).  Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."   

Valdés 2000:  "1990:  La Ministra de Educación Mercedes Cabanillas que postuló para Senadora en las elecciones presidenciales, obtuvo la más alta votación preferencial de todos los candidatos a Senadores de su partido (APRA).  Es elegida" (Anexo:  Participación política de las mujeres en los últimos 20 años:  Perú).

Vargas 1994:  "In the 1990 election, favorable conditions were created for women's representation on the national level.  For the first time, many party lists provided women with increased opportunities for candidacies.  During these elections, sixteen parties offered 960 candidates for senator, 129 of whom were women" (page 587).  "The APRA party has five women representatives.  CAMBIO '90 also has five women representatives.  FREDEMO has four congresswomen.  The Socialist Left has two women representatives" (page 589).

April 16

Radu 1990:  "For nearly a week after the election Lima was full of speculation that Vargas Llosa would refuse to participate in the second round...At the same time, Alberto Fujimori promised to present a full economic, political and anti-subversion program on Monday, April 16.  Not coincidentally, on that same day, apparently under heavy pressure from his family and allies within FREDEMO, Vargas Llosa ended speculation regarding his candidacy and formally declared hs decision to run in the second round" (volume 2 pages 10-11).  "The road to the second round" (volume 3 pages 2-5).


Conaghan 2005:  "Even with Fujimori poised to win, the second round was a bitter slugfest...Fujimori feared that the muckraking might turn up something damaging...It was at this point that Fujimori began his long, fateful association with Vladimiro Montesinos, an attorney known for his shadowy connections to Peru's underworld, the SIN, and the CIA...Montesinos quickly became Fujimori's ‘fixer' and principal campaign strategist" (page 19).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  6/5:  "A mediados de mes, el candidato Alberto Fujimori declara que su Plan de Gobierno es de tendencia populista" (page 675).

Klarén 2000:  "Religion became an issue when the Church, spurred by conservative members of the hierarchy, organized a rally on May 31, led by the new Archbishop Augusto Vargas Alzamora, protesting alleged insults by Fujimori's Protestant evangelicals...If Archbishop Vargas's outburst about Protestantism did not succeed in swaying many voters in the second-round electioneering, it nevertheless produced odd bedfellows in a Church divided, like most Peruvian institutions, between liberals and conservatives, some bishops supporting Vargas Llosa, a professed agnostic, against Fujimori, a practicing Catholic" (pages 404-405).

Radu 1990:  "Just after mid-May, Fujimori finally held a news conference with his proposed team of economists" (volume 2 page 11).  "As the inter-election period draws to a close, the Fujimori-Vargas Llosa race appears to be at a dead heat...Peru thus remains transfixed by the upcoming run-off election, and it is expected that voter turnout rates will remain high-at around the 80 percent mark.  If for no other reason, voting is compulsory under Peruvian law, and enforced with stiff fines.  The inter-election period has also been marked by an escalation of Sendero-led violence" (volume 2 page 12).

June 3

Radu 1990:  "Two events have decided the outcome of the presidential election on its second round:  the reassessment of the Peruvian political blocks after the April 8 first round of elections and the first and only televised debate between the two remaining presidential candidates on June 3" (volume 3 page 2).

June 10: second round

Conaghan 2000:  "The smashing defeat of Vargas Llosa sent conservative elites scrambling behind the scenes to influence the direction of the incoming Fujimori administration" (page 256).  "Vargas Llosa's...defeat in the 1990 presidential election stands as one of the most spectacular failures of the Right in recent Latin American history...(T)he Right's debacle in 1990 was part of the pathology of Peru's decomposing party system.  The behavior of the Right both contributed to, and was reflective of, the disintegrative processes at work in the system" (page 262).

Conaghan 2005:  Fujimori "trounced Vargas Llosa in the second round, winning 62.5 percent of the vote to Vargas Llosa's 37.5 percent" (page 20).

García Montero 2001:  "Después de haber obtenido un segundo puesto con estrecho margen de diferencia con Mario Vargas Llosa en la primera vuelta de la elección, Fujimori ‘destrozó' a su rival conservador en la segunda vuelta con el apoyo de los votantes de la izquierda y los apristas" (page 455).

Keesing's record of world events June 1990:  "In a reportedly high turnout of the 10,000,000 electorate, Fujimori received 4,522,463 votes (56.53 per cent).  Vargas Llosa, who had led on the first round on April 8, now won only 2,713,442 (33.92 per cent).  There were 627,552 (7.84 per cent) blank and spoiled votes, and 136,421 (1.7 per cent) officially recorded abstentions...The result accurately reflected the election campaign, which had sharply polarized the country on political, racial and class lines, despite the similarity, if not the style of presentation, of both candidates' short-term economic adjustment policies.  The middle classes, the business community and the traditional conservative parties endorsed Vargas Llosa's ‘economic shock' programme to solve the current economic crisis.  This was rejected by organized labour and, significantly, by the predominantly mixed races making up the bulk of the poor and underprivileged in cities, towns and in Andean Indian communities...Fujimori also attracted the votes given to the ruling APRA and other left-wing parties in the first round.  Fujimori, a Catholic himself, nevertheless received the support of the country's growing evangelical movement...The attempt by Lima's Roman Catholic hierarchy to mobilize Catholic opinion against him was seen to have failed" (electronic edition).

Klarén 2000:  "Fujimori picked up virtually most of the first-round votes for APRA and the Left and won a resounding victory-62 percent to Vargas Llosa's 38 percent" (page 405).

Levitt 2002:  "In the 1990 runoff election for president, APRA supported Fujimori over Vargas Llosa" (page 129).

Radu 1990:  "Analysis of the results" (volume 3 pages 5-11).

Rospigliosi 1992:  Discussion of election.  "Votos nulos y blancos (2a vuelta)" (page 380).  "Total nacional para presidente" (page 383).  Includes second round.  

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  "Elecciones generales 1990-segunda vuelta.  Resultado nacional" (page 497).  Gives votes for each candidate, "votos válidos," "votos nulos," "votos blancos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."  "Elecciones generales 1990-segunda vuelta.  Resultado departamental" (page 497).  Gives by department the percent of the vote for C90, Fredemo, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and the "inscritos (miles)."  "Elecciones generales 1990-segunda vuelta.  Resultado provincial" (pages 498-502).  Gives by province the percent of the vote for C90, Fredemo, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and the "inscritos (miles)."  "Elecciones generales 1990-segunda vuelta.  Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (page 503).  Gives by district  the percent of the vote for C90, Fredemo, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and the "inscritos miles." 


Adelman 2006:  Fujimori "seized upon the weakness of the state not to build a new legitimate order but to take what remained of state institutions-especially the military and intelligence structures-and refashion them into a mafioso state (to use Julio Cotler's term).  The sheer scale of the economic problems, the guerrilla war, and the utter collapse of faith in public authority gave Fujimori a degree of autonomy that he used to his own advantage as well as the advantage of a small group of magnates who recognized the conjunctural promise of turning the construction of a new order into their order" (page 61).

Conaghan 2005:  "No longer needing their help, Fujimori brushed off his fellow C90 members...(T)he C90 populists and evangelicals rapidly were purged or marginalized" (page 25).

Burt 2007:  "While the [CRF] seemed to fade from view with the change in government in July 1990, other paramilitary units emerged under the new Fujimori government.  This time, they were linked to [SIN], headed by Vladimiro Montesinos, a former army captain who became Fujimori's top advisor during the 1990 presidential campaign and became the regime's key architect of counterinsurgency policy.  Like the CRF, these units continued to target presumed subversives as well as individuals linked to the opposition" (page 49).  "Under Fujimori, the ‘rondas' were placed under the legal control of the army" (page 50).

Fleet 1997:  "Church-state relations under Fujimori got off to a poor start over the alleged influence of Protestants in the political newcomer's campaign organization" (page 251). 

Graham 1992:  "The prospects for the Fujimori government, which came to power with neither a program nor a governing team, were most unclear.  Only a few weeks before his inauguration, there was no coherent team of advisors, no key appointments had yet been made, and Fujimori's own political tendencies were not clear...In 1990 Peru's political spectrum and party system were fragmented and polarized to an unprecedented degree.  Peru was in a critical situation, in which there was little margin left for error, for flawed economic policymaking, for bad government" (page 154).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  10/7:  "Luego de la realización de una segunda vuelta electoral se declara la victoria del ingeniero Alberto Fujimori" (page 675).  28/7:  "La ceremonia de transmisión del mando se desarrolla en un ambiente de tensión...Crisis en Cambio 90:  renuncia el secretario general Víctor Homma y el presidente Alberto Fujimori cambia su equipo económico" (page 676).

Klarén 2000:  Fujimori assumes "office in July 1990" (page 406).  "Lacking his own institutional political base, Fujimori singled out the political parties, Congress, and the judiciary for increasing criticism" (page 409).  "Fujimori's first move to consolidate control over the military came on the day of his inauguration when he replaced the commanding officers of the navy and air force" (page 410).

Mayorga 2006:  "The opposition parties could have pressed Fujimori to step down, since the electoral results in 1990 had not led to a catastrophic defeat of FREDEMO and the traditional parties...The outcome was a Congress in which opposition parties had an overwhelming majority and, consequently, a minority government, leaving Fujimori in a very weak position.  Moreover, Fujimori had neither organized party support nor a government team with which to govern.  Fujimori's politics and the choices made by the opposition parties brought about a showdown, eventually causing the breakdown of the party system.  First, with the crucial aid of Vladimir Montesinos, Fujimori built a coalition with the military...Second, he forged a coalition with de facto powers-business groups, foreign investors, international organizations-in the framework of his neoliberal economic policies.  Third, by 1991, successful economic policies provided Fujimori with great legitimacy.  Finally, based on the authoritarian project, he decided to overrride congressional opposition and subordinate other democratic institutions" (pages 142-143).

Radu 1990:  "When sworn in on July 28, Alberto Fujimori faced a number of very serious political, economic and social problems.  The newly elected president's lack of a program, his scarce experience and his need for a qualified team of advisers could only exacerbate his, and the country's already major problem" (volume 3 pages 11-12).  "Politically, the most serious challenge for Fujimori is the absence of a parliamentary majority for the new president's party, Cambio 90" (volume 3 pages 13-14).

Schönwälder 2002:  "(T)he PUM's withdrawal in July 1990 from the national coordinating committee of Izquierda Unida, the Comité Directivo Nacional, further undermined the viabililty of the leftist alliance" (page 169).

Tanaka 2006:  "Once in office, Fujimori found himself with a minority in Congress...Fujimori had no possibility of aspiring to reelection in 1995 because reelection was prohibited by the 1979 Constitution.  Therefore, his presidency was perceived as a singular episode, certainly ephemeral, and once it was over, the parties would again occupy center stage.  Things turned out quite differently" (page 56).


Radu 1990:  "(T)he new government-which included former centrists, leftist independents, and army officers--took a very courageous, albeit imperfect, step toward bringing...efficiency to Peru's economy, at the risk of massive social dislocation and growing political violence.  Mario Vargas Llosa's feared economic shock, which brought about his electoral defeat, was thus replicated by the ‘Fujishock' presented on August 8 by Prime Minister Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller" (volume 3 page 2).


Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  25/9:  "Este mes es el de mayor violencia terrorista.  En Ayacucho se organizan nuevas Rondas Campesinas para proteger las comunidades" (page 676).


Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  "El Congreso nombra una comisión investigadora para acusar al ex presidente Alan García Pérez de enriquecimiento ilícito" (page 676).


Conaghan 2005:  "Fujimori's approval ratings improved as his attacks on congress intensified.  After the heated public exchanges and threats between Fujimori and congressional leaders in December 1991, Fujimori reached an approval rating of 65 percent-his best rating since his inauguration.  As Fujimori's personal approval ratings improved, those of the congress crashed" (page 30).


Hunefeldt 2004:  "By 1991 there were 3,435 ‘ronda' committees covering an area of 50,000 square miles on the coast and the northern highlands, where few peasant communities existed" (page 253).

Hunefeldt 2004:  "At the end of 1991, president Fujimori issues a decree that ultimately dismantled the initial social character of the agrarian reform.  This decree removed all restrictions on the sale of land and agrarian enterprises.  It was the beginning of a long and thorough privatization program that ultimately also included all previously state-owned public enterprises" (page 253).

McClintock 1994:  The 1980-85 Belaúnde administration did little to advance regionalization, but the García government promoted it vigorously, and a federal system became operative in 1991.  Each of twelve regional governments was composed of differing numbers of members, roughly 40 percent of them elected by popular vote, 30 percent of them mayors of provinces, and 30 percent of them delegates from popular organizations...The García government touted the regionalization program as its greatest achievement" (page 367).


Vargas 1994:  "In March 1991, as the result of one year's work in the Women's Forum, women in Parliament announced the constitution of a front called Women in Parliament" (page 587).


Seligmann 1995:  Fujimori "announced ‘the reform of the agrarian reform' in July of 1991 through two pieces of legislation, D.L. 011 and D.L. 018" (page 73).


Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  "Provoca gran escándalo el descubrimiento de que el penal de Canto Grande está prácticamente tomado por Sendero Luminoso y que en él se da entrenamiento a terroristas.  Durante el mes arrecian los atentados terroristas de Sendero y del MRTA.  El Perú es considerado el país más peligroso del mundo" (page 678).


Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  3/10:  "El Grupo Colina, integrado por miembros del Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), asesina a quince personas" (page 678).


Mayorga 2006:  "In November 1991, [Fujimori] deliberately presented 124 bills to Congress at once, but Congress demanded a partial revision.  Fujimori's underlying motive was to provoke a showdown with Congress by accusing it of incompetence and obstructive opposition to government policies.  A stalemate between the legislative and executive branches ensued, and Fujimori reacted by threatening to close the Congress" (page 143).

Obando 1998:  "(I)n November...the new Law of Military Standing...mandated that the comandantes generales would be designated by the president from among the generals of highest rank" (page 396).


Fleet 1997:  "In late 1991, conflict broke out between Fujimori and the Congress" (page 255).  "In December, Fujimori issued multiple-decree laws...but the Congress refused to ratify them within the thirty-day period.  Fujimori counterattacked, calling for the restructuring of the ‘do nothing' Congress" (page 256).

Obando 1998:  "In December 1991, the administration retired three institucionalista generals...slated to serve as comandantes generales of the army in 1992 and 1993 and as chief of the military staff in 1992.  Fujimori replaced them, upon Montesinos's recommendation, with General Nicolás Hermoza Ríos as comandante general of the army...These measures angered the institucionalistas, especially when they found out that Montesinos had been behind them" (page 396).


Barrig 1998:  "Dozens of previously unknown movements and community groups participated in the November 1992 constituent assembly elections and in the January 1993 municipal elections called by the president.  Many of these movements invited women leaders of popular organizations to join their lists of candidates, and quite a few accepted.  The virtual disappearance of many political cadres from the political scene, the nonparticipation of several important parties in the legislative election, and the social power these female leaders had achieved enhanced their visibility, and they were extensively filmed, photographed, and interviewed by the media" (pages 110-111).

McClintock 1998:  "(B)etween 1991 and 1992 Sendero killed forty-four leaders of grassroots organizations.  Many of these victims were members of the United Left (Izquierda Unida), the coalition of Marxist parties that was generally considered Peru's second strongest electoral force during the 1980s, but-in good part due to Sendero's complex and violent challenge-was relatively weak by the early 1990s" (page 295).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  Nueva Mayoría (1992) "formado por el presidente Alberto Fujimori para participar, junto con Cambio 90, en las elecciones al CCD de 1992" (page 681).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  Convergencia Democrática, CODE (1992) "formado por ex apristas...para participar en las elecciones al CCD de 1992" (page 681).

Vargas León 2007:  "Renovación es una agrupación fundada en 1992 para participar en las elecciones al Congreso Constituyente Democrático de ese año y reúne a independientes y militantes del movimiento Libertad" (page 236).


Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  1/1:  "Se promulga la Ley de Situación Militar, por la cual el Presidente ratifica el nombramiento de los generales de división y brigada, designa a los comandantes generales de las Fuerzas Armadas y puede prorrogar su permanencia en los cargos más allá del tiempo establecido para su pase al retiro" (pages 678-679).  4/1:  "El Presidente denuncia en televisión a los miembros del Congreso de la República por aumentarse los sueldos" (page 679).


Burt 2007:  "On February 15, 1992, a Shining Path hit squad murdered Maria Elena Moyano, an Afro-Peruvian community leader from Villa El Salvador...Moyano had become an outspoken critic of Shining Path...Shining Path accused Moyano of being a stooge of the state, emphasizing her role as deputy mayor of the town and ignoring the fact that she was also an implacable critic of the government for its failure to address the pressing needs of poor Peruvians and for human rights violations committed in the context of the war against Shining Path" (page 1).

NotiSur February 26, 1992:  "On Feb. 10, members of the national congress rejected 13 presidential decrees and modified three others.  President Alberto Fujimori reiterated the administration's refusal to implement legislation passed by the congress on Feb. 6, asserting that the government lacks necessary funds to do so...Senate leader Felipe Osterling protested Fujimori's intransigence...A recently approved law granting parliamentary control over the president's ‘actos normativos' took effect, with the aim of avoiding unconstitutional abuses of authority" (electronic edition).

Schönwälder 2002:  "In the early 1990s, Sendero Luminoso stepped up its activities and increasingly used terrorist tactics to subdue those urban popular movements it had not been able to penetrate before.  Sendero Luminoso hit squads began to assassinate selected urban popular movement leaders" (page 81).  "The most prominent victim of Sendero Luminosos's assassination campaign against urban popular movements was Maria Elena Moyano, who had risen through the ranks of the women's movement of Villa El Salvador to become vice-mayor of the district and a potential candidate of the Movimiento de Afirmación Socialista (MAS) for the Senate" (page 82).


Conaghan 2005:  "By March 1992, less than 20 percent of the public expressed confidence in congress as an institution" (page 30).  "Among the president's opponents, none was more volatile and potentially threatening than his own wife, Susana Higuchi de Fujimori" (page 85).  "Higuchi's trajectory as a whistle-blower began in March 1992, when she charged the president's relatives with mismanaging and trafficking in the charitable donations of clothing from Japan" (page 86).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  28 al 30/3:  "Susana Higuchi, esposa del Presidente, presenta una denuncia contra sus cuñados, a quienes acusa de vender ilícitamente donativos del Japón" (page 680).


Burt 2007:  "The ‘autogolpe' had created a new scenario on the ground:  the congress elected in 1990, dominated by opposition parties, was now disbanded; the regime could construct a new legislature that it could control more closely.  The 1979 constitution, with its ban on immediate presidential secession, could be replaced with a new document hand-tailored to meet the needs of the regime's authoritarian and neoliberal political project, including allowing for reelection to assure the regime's continuity in power while addressing the international imperative of free elections" (page 170).

Conaghan 2000:  "Fujimori's autocoup provoked new divisions within the Right.  The coup pitted the democratic segment of party elites against procoup sympathizers in party and business organizations.  Most of the top leaders of AP, the PPC, and the ML vigorously denounced the coup, but some defected and defended the measure" (page 257).

Conaghan 2005:  "The coup was the first salvo in Fujimori's effort to radically remake the political system.  He justified his actions as a means to resolve Peru's economic problems and beat back violent communist guerrillas" (page 3).  "Troops cordoned off APRA party headquarters along with those of the partido Popular Cristiano and Acción Popular" (page 28).   "In the days immediately after the coup, Fujimori argued that the country had been on the verge of a congress-led coup attempt...Coup supporters...maintained that opposition legislators were planning to remove Fujimori from office and would use Article 206 of the constitution to do so.  That article allowed congress to remove the president based on ‘moral incapacity'" (pages 30-31).  "On April 6, all of the major commercial polling firms swung into action, taking the first ‘flash' polls.  The three leading polling firms...confirmed public support of the measures that Fujimori announced" (page 33).  "Like the press, opposition political parties lacked the capability and the will to attack the polls" (page 35).  "The polls would not allow opponents to argue that the coup was unpopular; nor did critics make headway in defining the regime as a dictatorship in the public mind...With an elected civilian president still in power and press freedom restored, most Peruvians went along with Fujimori's claim that the government was democratic, albeit with some qualifications attached.  But Fujimori did not win the battle for public opinion completely.  Polls also revealed that the public, while supporting the coup, viewed it as a temporary corrective action...The rest of the world did not approve of the coup, at least not at first" (page 36).  Vice president San Román "was out of the country on April 5 and remained conspicuously silent until April 10, when he came out against the coup...San Román made a belated return to Peru on April 18.  He was subsequently sworn in on April 21 as constitutional president by what was left of the deposed congress...The U.S. government's decision on April 23 to continue recognizing Fujimori, rather than San Román, as Peru's president effectively ended the opposition's effort to establish a parallel government" (page 38).  "Speaking on behalf of opposition parties, Máximo San Román offered a blueprint for political transition on April 28" (page 38).  Gives details, also describes Fujimori's plan (page 39).  "In the interim between the coup of April 1992 and the swearing in of the new congress in December 1992, the executive branch issued hundreds of decrees recasting government institutions and their operating procedures...Many of the decrees...were never even made public" (page 41).  "The sweep of the executive's control over the state apparatus was not confined to the national level of government.  Another coup decree eliminated newly created regional assemblies.  It also gave the executive the power to appoint regional prefects, effectively creating a loyal corps of provincial officials beholden to the president.  This proved to be an enormous advantage in election campaigns, especially since C90 had no real party organization" (page 42).  "In the institutional vacuum that followed the coup, the contours of a new regime emerged.  On the surface, Fujimori embraced elections and civil liberties.  Behind the scenes, Fujimori and Montesinos were at work on a labyrinthine construct-a political apparatus that would assure them unchecked powers and untold opportunities" (page 43).  "Deposed congressional deputies and senators constituted the core of the opposition in the period immediately following the coup" (page 45).  Gives details.

Dietz 2002:  "President Alberto Fujimori declared an ‘autogolpe' by which he closed the Congress and Ministry of Justice and gathered power unto himself...Fujimori did all that he could to maintain control by aligning himself with the military and by overseeing the collapse of most political institutions that might oppose him, especially political parties" (page 202).

Fleet 1997:  "The ease with which President Alberto Fujimori assumed dictatorial powers in April 1992 sharply underscored the failure of the consolidation process begun in 1980.  Elites and nonelites alike apparently agreed with Fujimori that neither the Congress nor the judiciary were ‘working' properly, and that he needed virtually unchallengeable authority to resolve the country's economic and security problems" (page 251).  "In effect, Fujimori overthrew the other branches of government, and proceeded to rule by decree, unchecked by either legislative approval or independent media" (page 256).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  5/4:  "Se realiza el autogolpe o ‘Golpe de los Estropajos.'  El presidente Fujimori dirige un Mensaje a la Nación...en el cual anuncia que el país entra a una nueva etapa y declara disueltos los poderes Legislativo y Judicial, el Consejo de la Magistratura y el Ministerio Público.  La ciudad es patrullada por tanques y tanquetas.  La Fuerza Armada toma posesión del Congreso, del Palacio de Justicia y de la Contraloría General de la República.  Los presidentes de las cámaras son arrestados en sus domicilios" (page 680).  "A mediados de mes, los congresistas se reúnen en casa de la diputada Lourdes Flores Nano, declaran la vacancia de la Presidencia y entregan el poder al segundo vicepresidente, Carlos García y García, por ausencia del Primer Vicepresidente" (pages 680-681).

Klarén 2000:  "In the midst of the deteriorating situation, Fujimori shocked the country once more by carrying out an ‘autogolpe' (self-coup) on April 5, 1992.  Ending twelve years of democratic government, the president suspended the Constitution, closed Congress, and ordered the arrest of several opposition leaders.  With the backing of business and military leaders, he announced the creation of a ‘Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction' that would prepare the way for ‘true democracy'" (page 413).

Mayorga 2006:  "After the ‘autogolpe' in April 1992, Fujimori's government depended upon an extended spoils system and not on a pact of domination or political hegemony.  Although he lacked his own political organization and power structure, Fujimori built a broad power coalition consisting of himself and the de facto powers-the military, business, and international organizations.  An inner circle made up of Fujimori, Vladimir Montesinos, and the military eventually dominated this alliance...The most disturbing aspect of Fujimori's government was that Montesinos, who directed the SIN..., became the all-powerful executor of the pact with the military...The pact with the military was not made with the armed forces as an institution but with the highest-ranking officers within a system of personal mutual loyalties and favors, which Montesinos firmly controlled" (pages 148-149).

Nickson 1995:  "(I)n April 1992...President Fujimori dissolved the National Congress together with the recently elected regional governments.  Since then the regional tier of government has been emasculated to the point of virtual extinction" (page 239).

NotiSur February 26, 1992:  "April 5:  In a statement broadcast on nationwide TV and radio at about 11 p.m., President Alberto Fujimori, acting as ‘military commander-in-chief and in the name of guaranteeing order and preserving democracy,' announced that he had dissolved the congress and declared a state of emergency throughout Peruvian territory.  The president said the measures were temporary, motivated by plans to eliminate corruption, inefficiency and excessive bureaucracy" (electronic edition).  Gives highlights of the president's promised reforms. 

NotiSur April 22, 1992:  "April 8:  Fujimori promulgated several measures aimed at consolidating the new government...(T)roops were ordered to occupy all provincial assemblies and to replace local elected authorities with military officers...April 9:  During a clandestine meeting, a majority of members of the congress voted to declare the presidency ‘vacant,' due to Fujimori's ‘moral incapacity.'  Second vice president Carlos Garcia Garcia was designated as the country's new head of state.  Following the vote, Garcia Garcia was sworn in...April 12:  A communique by Carlos Garcia Garcia [states that first vice president Maximo] San Roman had formally accepted the title of constitutional head of state, effective upon his return to Peru...April 14:  In Lima, Fujimori's Cambio 90 party formally voted to expel first Vice President Maximo San Roman.  Fujimori announced that November 1992 municipal elections will take place on schedule.  He said new elections are to be organized to fill posts left vacant by the recent decree dissolving regional assemblies...April 20:  US State Department spokespersons told reporters that the Bush administration will continue to recognize Alberto Fujimori as the legitimate president of Peru" (electronic edition).

NotiSur May 13, 1992:  "April 21:  In a speech broadcast nationwide on radio and TV, President Alberto Fujimori announced a timetable for a ‘return to democracy.'  The calendar includes a July 5 plebiscite to ‘verify support' for the government's programs; publication of a reform package by Aug. 31; elections for municipal and regional government officials and a plebiscite to ratify constitutional amendments scheduled for Nov. 8; and, members of the national congress elected on Feb. 28, 1993, would take office on April 5 next year.  Vice President Maximo San Roman was sworn in as Peru's ‘constitutional president' by members of the congress dissolved by Fujimori on April 5.  All political parties represented in the congress, excepting Fujimori's Cambio 90, had declared support for San Roman...April 23:  A special Organization of American States (OAS) mission sent to Lima concluded a three-day visit... April 27:  Opposition party spokespersons told reporters they supported a proposal for electing a constituent assembly which would be in charge of returning Peru to constitutional rule.  The proposal is reportedly backed by the leader of the OAS mission...April 28:  San Roman proposed that constituent assembly elections take place July 5" (electronic edition).

Palmer 2000:  "(F)ormer President García...was forced into exile after the ‘autogolpe' and lost his leadership role in APRA" (pages 241-242).

Philip 2003:   "In retrospect, there can be little doubt that Peruvian representative institutions were very vulnerable in April 1992.  The obvious point is that both Fujimori and his military supporters had everything to gain by closing congress and ruling through the executive because there was every likelihood that the move would be popular-as indeed it turned out to be" (page 160).  "(T)here was an activist set of military officers who certainly were prepared to intervene in the political process.  At some point after the election of Fujimori, these interventionists and the Fujimori government came to an understanding.  Fujimori had been elected, but he had few congressional allies and no organized source of support...He was clearly receptive to the idea of an alliance with the military.  It is generally accepted that the active architect of this alliance was Vladimiro Montesinos" (page 163).


Conaghan 2005:  "Another decision laid the basis for a bureaucratic-based clientelism.  Fujimori created the Ministerio de la Presidencia in May 1992.  The ministry, established by executive decree, administered international aid donations and built public works, including housing.  With one stroke of the pen, Fujimori created a superministry with a budget that would be wielded indiscriminately for electoral purposes" (page 42).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  7/5:  "Se crea el Ministerio de la Presidencia, que limita las funciones y los fondos de las regiones y municipios" (page 681).

Keesing's record of world events May 1992:  "The prospects of talks diminished after Fujimori's announcement on May 24 that the proposal for the ‘constitutional congress' would be put to a national plebescite on July 6.  The opposition stated that this was tantamount to ‘legitimizing the coup' and on May 28 set conditions for future dialogue...On May 13 [Fujimori] had enraged the opposition by dismissing the president and vice-president of the National Electoral Board and naming César Polack Romero to be its new head...Jorge del Castillo of the main opposition [APRA]...announced on May 15 that the party would not participate in the municipal elections, still scheduled to take place in November 1992" (electronic edition).

Klarén 2000:  "While remaining popular at home, Fujimori was widely criticized abroad for his abrogation of democracy...As a result, Fujimori backtracked and agreed in...May to call elections for a constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution and to hold municipal elections later in the year" (page 414).

McClintock 1998:  "On 22 May, 660 pounds of dynamite exploded in the center of Peru's banking district" (pages 87-88).

NotiSur May 13, 1992:  "May 4:  In a joint statement, 13 political parties and organizations expressed support for the OAS proposal to elect a constituent assembly.  The statement said Fujimori's resignation is a prerequisite for such elections...May 5:  The OAS delegation concluded an attempt at negotiations...Fujimori reportedly refused to discuss the possibility of organizing elections for a constituent assembly" (electronic edition).

NotiSur May 27, 1992:  "May 13:  The Supreme Court appointed Cesar Polack Romero as head of the National Electoral Tribunal (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones).  Polack Romero replaced Carlos Castaneda, who was fired by Fujimori...May 15:  Approximately 20,000 people participated in a demonstration against Fujimori's government...The event marked the first major mobilization of opposition forces since April 5...May 18:  In a speech before the OAS assembly in Nassau, Fujimori fiercely defended his decision to suspend constitutional rule.  He also provided details on his program for ‘restoring democracy,' over the next ‘several months'...The president said that within the next five months, basic civil rights and constitutional liberties are to be restored, and 80 members of a constitutent assembly elected.  The assembly will also have legislative and fiscal responsibilities...May 21:  In a joint statement, the 13 opposition political parties demanded the ‘undeniable right' to ‘participate in, construct and defend Peruvian democracy' via an open dialogue with the government, under OAS auspices" (electronic edition).

NotiSur June 10, 1992:  "May 29:  In a joint statement, former deputies of the dismantled national congress rejected Fujimori's plan for a plebiscite on his government scheduled for July 5.  Fujimori announced the previous week that the plebiscite would be carried out despite opposition.  The opposition parties see the plebiscite as an attempt to legitimize the de facto government...May 31:  Peruvian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Oscar de la Puente told reporters that he will serve as spokesperson for the government in talks with political party leaders...De la Puente said the July 5 plebiscite had been cancelled, but did not rule out popular plebiscites either before or after the constituent assembly elections" (electronic edition).


Conaghan 2005:  "The OAS required that the government start a ‘dialogue' with the opposition to plan the political transition, but it never stipulated how the dialogue would be structured...Fujimori continued his furious attacks on traditional parties and the political class...Opposition leaders reacted, announcing that they would not participate in the National Dialogue meeting of June 30 unless it included separate meetings with party leaders to address issues related to the restoration of democracy" (page 46).  "As the government geared up for the National Dialogue at the end of June, opposition leaders called for a separate dialogue with parties, to be mediated by the Roman Catholic Church, but Fujimori rejected the idea" (page 47).  Discusses decisions by various parties to participate.

Fleet 1997:  "MRTA leader Victor Polay [is captured] in June 1992" (page 257).

McClintock 1998:  "On 5 June, an attack was launched against one of Peru's major television stations" (page 88).

NotiSur June 10, 1992:  "June 1:  Fujimori announced that elections for a constitutional congress had been scheduled for Oct. 18...Fujimori said constitutional amendments approved by the assembly will not be promulgated until endorsed by citizens in a subsequent plebiscite.  The president added that the constituent assembly will consist of a maximum 80 members, who ‘must have no political commitments.'  Constituent assembly members are to be prohibited from running for seats in the national congress" (electronic edition).

NotiSur July 7, 1992:  "June 17:  Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Oscar de la Puente confirmed that constituent assembly elections will take place on Nov. 22.  He said municipal elections, previously scheduled for Nov. 8, had been postponed until early 1993.  The assembly elections had originally been scheduled for Oct. 18.  In response to a request by the Catholic Church hierarchy, the date was changed because of a conflict with an important religious holiday...June 26:  Ten opposition parties requested that the Catholic Church serve as mediator in talks with administration officials.  Fujimori said his government is willing to talk with all social sectors, and consequently, ‘there is no need for a mediator.'  Church spokespersons indicated that the hierarchy would not intervene in the national dialogue in the absence of formal requests to do so by both the government and the political opposition" (electronic edition).

July 10

NotiSur July 21, 1992:  "July 10:  Cesar Polack, president of the National Elections Board (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones-JNE), announced that the [OAS] would provide financial assistance to the JNE to prepare for the Nov. 22 constituent assembly elections" (electronic edition).

July 13

NotiSur July 21, 1992:  "President Alberto Fujimori rejected a proposal by party leaders calling for municipal elections on Nov. 22, the same day as polling for constituent assembly members.  He said holding the two elections on separate occasions would ensure greater participation in the municipal elections.  Next, Fujimori proposed a single-member regional district formula for the constituent assembly elections, in contrast to a national proportional representation procedure.  Opposition party representatives harshly criticized the proposal, described as a threat to existence of minority political parties" (electronic edition).

July 14

NotiSur July 21, 1992:  "July 14:  A proposal by the independent Freedom and Democracy Institute (ILD) for the simultaneous election of a constituent assembly and a congress with broad oversight responsibilities was praised by President Fujimori as ‘permitting greater citizen representation and increased accountability of elected representatives.'  The ILD is an independent think tank run by Fujimori's former anti-drug adviser Hernando de Soto.  According to the ILD proposal, on Nov. 22 voters would choose 80 members of the constituent assembly, and 80 legislators.  The assembly would be in session for two years, and members of the new congress until the end of Fujimori's term in 1995.  The proposal also includes a national referendum on constitutional amendments adopted by the assembly" (electronic edition).  Gives further details.

July 15

NotiSur July 21, 1992:  "July 15:  Opposition political parties officially rejected the ILD electoral reform proposal" (electronic edition).

July 16

McClintock 1998:  "On 16 July, in the worst terrorist incident of the war, Sendero detonated a truck bomb on the small street of Tarata in Miraflores, a neighborhood that is the center of middle-class Lima life...The Tarata bomb was the start of a weeklong wave of terror-daily attacks against police stations, factories, schools, commercial enterprises, and even a think tank" (page 88). 

July 18

Burt 2007:  "Perhaps the most infamous case demonstrating the absence of checks and balances, as well as the undue power of the armed forces in the political process, is the Cantuta case...Suspicions that the abduction of the students and professor was the work of the Grupo Colina death squad, comprising members of the SIN and army intelligence (SIE), have since been confirmed" (page 181).

Conaghan 2005:  "(O)n July 18, 1992...nine students and one university professor of the Universidad Enrique Guzmán y Valle (more popularly known as La Cantuta) ‘disappeared.'  The victims were kidnapped and killed in an operation undertaken by an elite military squad working under supervision of the army intelligence service" (pages 66-67).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  "El Ejército realiza un operativo en la Universidad Nacional de Educación Enrique Guzmán y Valle (La Cantuta).  Son secuestrados nueve estudiantes y un profesor.  Se responsabiliza al Grupo Colina, dirigido por el mayor Santiago Martín Rivas" (page 681).

July 22

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  22/7:  "Sendero Luminoso decreta la realización de un ‘paro armado' en Lima" (page 681).

July 28

Conaghan 2005:  "(I)n his annual Independence Day speech to congress on July 28...Fujimori...concluded with a bold announcement:  the election for a unicameral CCD of no more than eighty members would take place on November 22, 1992, to be followed by municipal elections in February 1993" (page 48). 

Latin American monitor.  Andean group July-August 1992:  "The most important element of [the state of the nation] speech was President Fujimori's announcement that municipal elections scheduled for November would now be held in early February 1993.  Elections have already been called for November 22 to choose a Congress which will draft a new constitution...Announcement of the November elections triggered the release of some of the aid frozen by official bilateral creditors following the President's dissolution of Congress in April" (page 1041).

NotiSur August 11, 1992:  "Maximo San Roman, the former vice president who was appointed constitutional president by the dissolved congress, reiterated his proposal for the creation of a transitional government...In an independence day address to the nation, Fujimori...announced that municipal elections have been scheduled for Feb. 7, 1993.  He said elections for a ‘constituent congress' will take place Nov. 22, and those elected will begin their terms on Jan. 2.  Fujimori said the 80-member unicameral congress will be charged with drawing up reforms to the 1980 constitution, as well as carrying out traditional legislative functions until legislative elections are held.  The constitutional reform package will be subject to referendum...Fujimori said the process of national dialogue, initiated in June, will be complete by Aug. 18.  This, he said, will allow for announcement of regulations for the electoral process 90 days before the actual elections.  Parties and political independents can register candidates 45 days before the election dates" (electronic edition).

July 29

NotiSur August 11, 1992:  "Members of the dissolved congress criticized Fujimori's speech as ‘unrealistic' and a personal endorsement of his own dictatorship'" (electronic edition).

July 31

NotiSur August 11, 1992:  "Oscar de la Puente, who serves as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, formally announced the second phase of dialogue with opposition parties for Aug. 4.  The [AP and APRA] parties immediately announced they would not participate in the talks.  The other parties delayed announcing a decision regarding participation in the dialogue" (electronic edition).


Conaghan 2005:  The "agreement...included four party organizations along with the government's own C90.  The accord settled on the CCD as a unicameral body, elected with deputies selected in a single, national electoral district using a double-preferential voting system...The accord was an enormous blow to the rest of the opposition. Even though the four parties...were tiny organizations with scant electoral support, their official involvement was sufficient to create the appearance that the government had complied with the OAS demand to consult with the opposition" (pages 48-49).  "The president's cabinet, the council of ministers, brought the controversial dialogue to an official close on August 18...The legal decree...provided that the CCD would stay in operation until July 28, 1995, thus ruling out the prospect of advancing a new set of elections.  The decree also mandated a reregistration of all political parties for the CCD election, subjecting even established parties like APRA and AP to the onerous process of collecting one hundred thousand signatures on registration petitions in short order.  The reregistration requirement allowed the government leeway to block the participation of some parties or to flood the contest by allowing scores of ‘independent' movements to register.  Another provision barred representatives elected to the CCD from being candidates in the next legislative election in 1995" (page 49).  "The OAS scheduled another meeting to assess the situation in Peru...Less than forty-eight hours after the original CCD decree, the cabinet reconvened to amend it.  It struck...the controversial [provision] concerning the reregistration of existing parties" (page 50).

Keesing's record of world events August 1992:  "The [OAS] announced in Washington on Aug. 28 that it had decided to send observers to oversee the elections for a [CCD] scheduled to be held on Nov. 22...In the light of the OAS decision, Fujimori stated on Aug. 30 that there was no remaining excuse for political parties not to participate in the elections...The opposition was further alienated by a clause in a government decree law of Aug. 22 governing the eligibility of candidates representing unregistered political parties, independent organizations and alliances to stand for election to the CCD" (electronic edition).  Gives additional details.

Klarén 2000:  "As announced in the details worked out in July and August, the CCD was to be a single chamber, composed of 80 members whose terms would last until the end of Fujimori's term on July 28, 1995.  The CCD was charged with writing a new constitution, subject to approval by a national plebiscite, as well as proposing new legislation and exercising the power of oversight over the executive" (page 416).

NotiSur August 11, 1992:  "Aug. 4:  Shortly before the dialogue was scheduled to begin, leaders of the principal opposition parties [AP, APRA, PPC, ML, PUM, IS, UIR] issued a joint statement announcing their decision to not participate.  They said that, given Fujimori's unilateral establishment of the structure and election rules for the ‘constituent congress,' there was no longer a basis for discussion...Only the four smallest parties, including Fujimori's Cambio 90 Movement, met with de la Puente at the dialogue session.  Those present signed a document urging dissident political organizations to join the talks, rescheduled for Aug. 7-18" (electronic edition).

NotiSur August 25, 1992:  "Aug. 11:  Fujimori rejected an offer from the 13 major opposition parties to hold parallel ‘egalitarian' negotiations.  The offer was also opposed by the six small opposition parties which originally accepted the government's invitation to negotiate...The six parties were the...Sociedad y Democracia...party, the...Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos..., the...Frente Independiente Moralizador..., the...Convergencia Socialista..., the...Fraternidad Parlamentaria...and Fujimori's Cambio 90 movement...Aug. 12:   The 13 major political parties decided to meet with Oscar de la Puente...to discuss the possibility of uniting government and opposition dialogues...Aug. 13:  De la Puente rejected mediation by the [OAS] in the dialogue between the government and opposition parties...He further emphasized that if the 13 parties eventually agree to enter negotiations with the government, they would be joining the current dialogue already underway with six smaller parties and not initiating a new or separate dialogue.  Aug. 16:  Talks between the government and opposition parties began...Aug. 17:  De la Puente announced that the date for municipal elections had been changed, for a second and final time, to Jan. 29, 1993.  The government saw the move as a conciliatory gesture toward the 13 opposition parties, who insisted the elections be held during 1992...The [AP], APRA, ML and PCP...withdrew from the dialogue process following the announcement regarding the municipal elections date...Aug. 18:  The government-opposition dialogue concluded with no significant results" (electronic edition).  Gives details on topics covered in dialogue sessions and lists parties in the August 16 talks.

NotiSur September 8, 1992:  "Aug. 25:  President Alberto Fujimori announced changes in election laws for the constituent congress, called the...Congreso Constituyente Democratico, CCD.  The laws were promulgated Aug. 22.  The modifications lowered the minimum age requirement for candidates from 30 to 21 years and exempted political organizations previously registered with the National Elections Council from the requirement of obtaining 100,000 signatures in order to appear on the ballot...Aug. 28:  The OAS decided not to send a special mission to Peru to assist in organizing the CCD elections" (electronic edition).


Burt 2007:  "Without a doubt, the arrest of Guzmán and other top Shining Path leaders resulted in a significant shift in the balance of forces.  It reversed the image that the state was losing the war against Shining Path, and thus helped restore legitimacy to the Peruvian state...It created crucial political capital for the Fujimori regime, whose popularity rating of 80 percent at the time of the April coup was flagging to around 60-65 percent" (pages 173-174).

Conaghan 2005:  "Once it was clear that elections would proceed on Fujimori's terms, opposition leaders had to decide whether or not to participate" (page 50).  Discusses various parties' decisions (pages 50-52).  "Questions about the conduct of the election were sidelined...by a new story that dwarfed all others:  the stunning capture of Abimael Guzmán" (page 54). 

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  12/9:  "Luego de un largo operativo de seguimiento, preparado por el general PNP Antonio Ketín Vidal en colaboración con la Dincote (Dirección Nacional contra el Terrorismo), son apresados el jefe de Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, y su Estado Mayor en una residencia en San Borja" (page 681).

McClintock 1998:  "(T)he Shining Path was an authoritarian organization dominated by one man, Abimael Guzmán.  From 1980 until 12 September 1992, authoritarianism appeared to abet the organization's advance...But on 12 September 1992, when Guzmán was captured, all the assets of authoritarianism suddenly appeared as deficiencies" (page 91).  "(T)he key counterinsurgency breakthrough was the capture of Guzmán by the GEIN on 12 September 1992" (page 147).

NotiSur September 8, 1992:  "Sept.2:  Fujimori announced that ‘two or three weeks' before the Nov. 22 elections for the CCD he will openly participate in the electoral campaign, supporting a list of independent candidates.  Fujimori said he endorses the independent candidates and hopes they win a majority of the 80 seats in the CCD" (electronic edition).

NotiSur September 8, 1992:  "On Sept. 12, Peruvian Anti-terrorist Police captured Sendero Luminoso rebel leader Abimael Guzman...and several other high-ranking rebel leaders...Victor Polay, leader of  [MRTA]  was captured by authorities [in June].  These two major anti-insurgency victories since President Alberto Fujimori's April 5 ‘auto-golpe'...are expected to boost his popularity" (electronic edition).

Obando 1998:  "On 12 September 1992...Guzmán was captured by the DINCOTE...The mortal blow to Sendero elimated the risk of a possible triumph by Shining Path, and the institucionalistas, led by General Jaime Salinas, ended up abandoning the idea of a coup" (page 397).

Palmer 2000:  "What saved Fujimori's authoritarian gamble was the careful police work of a small, specialized antiterrorist group in the Ministry of the Interior, formed under García, which paid off with the dramatic capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán and key lieutenants on September 12, 1992" (page 242).

Philip 2003:   "There is little doubt that Fujimori, Montesinos and the supporters of the April 1992 coup were prepared to launch a full-scale ‘dirty war' against Sendero Luminoso.  However, in September 1992 the head of Sendero, Abimael Guzmán, was arrested in Lima-by the Peruvian police and not by Montesinos or his allies.  The Fujimori government quickly took credit for this, and did follow up Guzmán's capture intelligently" (page 165).  "When on 22 September 1992 Fujimori gave a detailed timetable for the resumption of electoral politics in Peru, the IDB called off the lending embargo that it had informally put in place in April" (page 168).


NotiSur November 3, 1992:   "As of the Oct. 29 deadline, candidate lists for political parties and independents planning to participate in the Nov. 22 elections for the constituent assembly were complete.  Approximately 2,240 candidates will compete for the 80 seats in the assembly...If they meet all requirements, including approval of the signature lists by the [JNE], a total of 19 different parties and independent groups will compete in the elections.  The country's two largest political parties, the [APRA and Acción Popular]-as well as the smaller [Movimiento Libertad], the [PUM], the [Partido Comunista Peruano] and the [Union de Izquierda Revolucionaria]-have refused to participate.  [Nueva Mayoria], a coalition which brings together Fujimori's [Cambio 90] and the union of independent candidates led by Fujimori's former energy minister Jaime Yoshiyama Tanaka, is expected to come out ahead in the vote, perhaps achieving control over a majority [of] seats in the assembly.  On October 30, Fujimori raised the possibility that the constitution could be amended to permit presidential re-election for consecutive terms.  Under the current constitution, presidents are only eligible for re-election following an interval of five years out of office" (electronic edition).

November 13

Conaghan 2005:  "Another dramatic event that preyed on the public's fear of political instability also worked in the government's favor.  On the night of November 13, General Jaime Salinas and other dissident officers were arrested on charges of plotting to overthrow the Fujimori government...Fujimori...asserted that the plot included a plan to assassinate him...Salinas said that the objective was to remove Fujimori from office and turn him over for trial for violating Peru's constitution.  Moreover, Salinas said that he had acted in order to stop the ongoing election fraud" (page 55).

Keesing's record of world events November 1992:  "According to official accounts of the events of Nov. 13, the conspiracy was organized by three retired army generals-Jaime Salinas Sedo, José Pastor Vives and Luis Palomino Rodríguez...According to a statement received by the weekly ‘Oiga,' Salinas accepted responsibility for the coup attempt and declared that its aim had been to hand over the presidency to Máximo San Román Cáceres, Fujimori's dismissed First Vice-President named ‘constitutional president' by the dissolved Congress" (electronic edition).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group December 1992:  "On 13 November, according to government sources, a small group of army officers attempted to seize the government palace and army headquarters and assassinate President Fujimori.  The government alleged that the aim of the plotters was to stop the 22 November election and to install vice-president Maximo San Roman as president...The coup attempt was easily and bloodlessly put down" (page 1087).

November 22:  constituent assembly election

Burt 2007:  "Fujimori insisted that the new legislature should be unicameral, which he argued would be more representative and more efficient than the previous two-chamber legislature" (page 171).

Conaghan 2000:  "The machinations surrounding the election and opposition disunity produced a victory for NM-C90" (page 267).

Conaghan 2005:  "The CCD election was set for November 22.  Eighteen political organizations made it onto the CCD ballot.  Most of the groups were new and unknown to voters.  In a departure from the traditional format of ballots in Peru, the JNE designed a ballot that listed the organizations in three separate categories:  parties, independent groups, and alliances.  As the only official ‘alliance,' C90-NM Alianza ended up as a highly visible entry at the bottom of the ballot, separated out from the unrecognizable names that preceded it...C90-NM won 38 percent of the valid vote and forty-four of the eighty seats.  Voter abstention, which accounted for 27.8 percent of the electorate, was the highest registered in any contemporary election.  Taking abstention into account, the results meant that the government majority had been voted into power by just 27.7 percent of all eligible voters...Heading an election mission with two hundred observers, OAS secretary-general João Baena Soares baptized the CCD election as free and fair" (pages 55-56).

Crabtree 1993:  "On 22 November 1992, Peruvians went to the polls to elect a new single-chamber constituent Congress, following nine months of ‘de facto' presidential rule.  The new Congress was not only to act as a legislature for what remained of President Alberto Fujimori's five-year term (1990-95), but had the specific task of redrafting the 1979 Constitution" (page 264).  "Election results for the constituent congress (November 1992)" (page 266).

Dietz 1998:  "Fujimori held legislative elections in November 1992, which most major opposition parties boycotted, thereby giving him a working majority in the Congress.  Local elections, which were to have been held in November 1992, were finally run in early 1993" (page 206).  Fujimori "called for congressional elections in November 1992, postponed the municipal contests scheduled for that time, and charged the new Congress with the job of producing a new constitution" (page 214).

Dietz 2002:  "Most of the trappings of procedural democracy were restored after elections later in 1992 for a constituent congress that replaced the 1979 constitution" (page 202).

Klarén 2000:  "Several of the main opposition parties, including APRA, AP, and Vargas Llosa's Libertad abstained from the vote while the United Left and Socialist Accord were unable to participate because they had failed to receive the minimum 5 percent necessary to qualify in the previous election.  Facing only the PPC and a number of other minor parties and groups, many of them lesser-known stand-ins for the traditional parties, Nueva Mayoría/Cambio 90 won a 38 percent plurality of the vote and a majority of 44 out of 80 seats" (page 416).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group December 1992:  "As expected, political parties supporting President Albert Fujimori won an absolute majority in the 22 November consituent assembly elections.  The New Majority/Change 90 alliance, a loose coalition headed by former Energy and Mines Minister Jaime Yoshiyama, gained 44 out of the 80 seats in the new assembly.  The only other groupings to secure a significant number of seats were three right-wing parties-the Popular Christian Party, Renovation, and the [FIM]-all of which are expected to support the government on most issues...The election underlined the declining popularity of legal left-wing parties, which have been fragmented in recent years by political disputes and personal antagonisms...(L)eftist parties as a whole gained only 5% of the popular vote" (page 1087).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group January 1993:  Lourdes Flores Nano of the PPC "obtained the third highest individual vote in the November poll and will be Peru's most important opposition leader in 1993" (page 1099).

NotiSur November 24, 1992:  "On Nov. 22, elections were held for the 80 seats in the [CCD].  A total of 1,440 candidates, representing 18 parties, participated in the elections...Various opposition parties refused to participate in the elections including [APRA, AP, ML], and three parties affiliated with the [Izquierda Unida] coalition:  the [PCP, UNIR, and PUM]...According to the OAS observers, the election was not marred by fraud or other difficulties...Official results are expected to be released in early December.  According to unofficial results, although voter turnout was high, about one voter in five turned in a blank ballot.  Voting is mandatory for citizens between the ages of 16 and 70 and abstention is punished with a US$75 fine" (electronic edition).  Gives further details.

Palmer 2000:  "Fujimori, chastened by the intensity of the international response, agreed immediately to prompt electoral restoration.  This was accomplished with national elections for a new, smaller, one-house Congress-cum-constitutional-convention in November 1992" (page 241).

Rospigliosi 1998:  "Elecciones para el congreso constituyente:  noviembre de 1992" (pages 407-417).  "Perú:  resultados de las elecciones del congreso constituyente democrático 22 de noviembre de 1992" (page 438).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  "Congreso constituyente democrático 1992-1995.  Número de parlamentarios por partido político" (page 67).  "Congreso constituyente democrático 1992-1995" (page 79-80).  "Elecciones congreso constituyente democrático 1992.  Resultado nacional" (page 485).  Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."  

"Elecciones congreso constituyente democrático 1992.   Resultado departamental" (page 486).  Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Elecciones congreso constituyente democrático 1992.  Resultado provincial" (pages 487-494).  Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Elecciones congreso constituyente democrático 1992.  Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 495-496).  Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." 

Valdés 2000:  "En 1992, para las elecciones del Congreso Constituyente Democrático, el 12% de las candidaturas fue mujeres y sólo el 8% de los elegidos, la mayoría de Cambio 90, movimiento que apoya a Fujimori" (Anexo:  Participación política de las mujeres en los últimos 20 años:  Perú).

Van Cott 2006:  "In Peru, indigenous organizations were too weak to elect delegates to the 1993 Constituent Congress" (page 169).


Conaghan 2000:  "One of the CCD's first acts was to affirm the legality of all actions taken by the government in the interim between April 5 and the installation of the CCD" (page 267).

Conaghan 2005:  "The CCD held its inaugural session on December 29, 1992...The government majority legalized all the decrees issued by the executive branch on and after April 5 and also ratified Alberto Fujimori as the ‘constitutional head of state'" (page 56).

Keesing's record of world events December 1992:  "The official results of the legislative elections held on Nov. 22 were announced on Dec. 5, confirming that the New Majority-Change-90 (NM-Cambio-90) coalition supporting President Alberto Keinya Fujimori would hold 44 of the 80 seats in the new [CCD].  The first CCD session opened on Dec. 30...The main opposition parties had boycotted the elections" (electronic edition).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group December 1992:  "The constituent assembly will replace the two-chamber parliament dissolved by Mr Fujimori on 5 April.  The assembly, which is due to open on 30 December, will draw up a new constitution as well as fulfilling legislative and watchdog functions.  It will sit until Mr Fujimori's present term of office ends in 1995, following which a permanent congress will be elected under the reformed constitution" (page 1087).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group January 1993:  "The sweeping victory in the 22 November constituent assembly elections for candidates supporting President Fujimori should ensure that the government's ongoing structural reforms wil continue...As well as support from New Majority and Change 90, which together gained 44 out of 80 seats, the government can expect support from a number of the small parties formed specifically to contest the election.  The largest established opposition party in the assembly will be the [PPC].  The PPC's new leader is is Lourdes Flores Nano, a young lawyer who strongly opposed the 5 April coup" (page 1099).

NotiSur January 12, 1993:  "(I)n the aftermath of an attempted coup in November 1992, opposition to the Fujimori government has been increasingly evident in both the political and military arenas.  The government has strongly denied rumors of discontent within the military...The pro-government majority in the CCD approved a measure which recognized Alberto Fujimori as ‘Constitutional President' until 1995.  Opposition representatives voted against the proposal.  The measure also restored the 1980 constitution which had been suspended as part of Fujimori's ‘auto-golpe'" (electronic edition).


Burt 2007:  "Perhaps the most controversial clause [in the 1993 constitution] was the one that allowed for immediate presidential reelection.  The progovernment majority steam-rolled the process, limiting debate time allotted to the opposition, and approved the final document when opposition members were absent" (page 171).

Hunefeldt 2004:  "The 1993 constitution makes the president...both chief of state and head of the government.  The president is elected by a plurality of the popular vote for a five-year term.  Run-off elections are held between the two top vote getters in the event no single candidate receives a plurality in the first election.  There are also two vice presidents and a prime minister, but the president exercises all executive powers.  The national legislative body is the uni-cameral 120-member Congress of the Republic of Peru, whose members are elected by popular vote for five-year terms" (page 267).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group January 1993:  "The leader of the mid-November military coup attempt, retired General Jaime Salinas, together with several other implicated army officers, have been sent to the maximum security Miguel Castro Castro jail east of Lima.  The move angered senior military figures and Peru's traditional political parties and breaks with a long tradition of holding detained military officers in armed forces installations rather than public prisons...The 22 November election has convinced foreign creditors that Peru is serious about making a return to democracy and foreign financial inflows have picked up...Not surprisingly, Japan has made the swiftest and most enthusiastic response in terms of increased aid" (page 1099).

McClintock 1998:  "By mid-1993, there were more than four thousand ‘rondas' in Peru, involving approximately three hundred thousand peasants.  Important as the ‘rondas' appeared to be to the defeat of Sendero, it is also the case that the ‘rondas' were supervised by soldiers and that military supervision by definition undermines civilian authority in peasant communities" (pages 148-149).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  "El derecho electoral activo es el que estipula las condiciones para elegir.  En el Perú la Constitución de 1993 establece que tienen derecho a voto los peruanos de nacimiento y naturalizados mayores de 18 años, que tengan documento de identidad.  Están exceptuados los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y Policiales en actividad.  El voto es obligatorio, y para los mayores de 70 años, facultativo" (page 23).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2008:  "El primer intento de referéndum que se dio fue aquel que pretendía cuestionar la constitucionalidad de la Ley núm. 26657, que modificaba, vía interpretación constitucional, el artículo 112 de la Constitución y con ello permitía una tercera reelección de Alberto Fujimori.  Este referéndum no se convocó, a pesar de contar con el respaldo de más de un millón y medio de firmas, porque tanto el Congreso de la República como el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, con la presencia de autoridades comprometidas con el proyecto autoritario del gobierno, realizaron modificaciones en la ley e interpretaciones inconstitucionales, respectivamente, que ocasionaron que esta iniciativa fuera archivada por el Congreso" (page 843).

Van Cott 2005:  "Indigenous mayors gained representation in regional assemblies before Fujimori dismantled regional governments in 1993" (page 160).  "The Fujimori-dominated 1993 constitutional reform was a disaster for indigenous peoples.  Indigenous organizations and anthropologists mobilized unsuccessfully against Fujimori's changes and presented a petition with 55,000 signatures to the Constitutuent Congress opposing the elimination of land and language rights that had been recognized in previous constitutions...The most devastating blow was the removal of the inalienability and indivisibility of indigenous lands" (page 164).

Van Cott 2006:  "President Fujimori, who opposed indigenous rights, dominated [the Constituent Congress] and rejected their claims.  The result was a serious setback for Peruvian Indians" (page 169).


NotiSur January 26, 1993:  "As of Jan. 25, a total of 17 politicians, including at least 10 candidates for the municipal elections, had been murdered by suspected rebels since the elections campaign began in late November.  Another 100 candidates have resigned from the race in response to threats...In an attempt to head off rebel attacks during the municipal elections, on Jan. 21 nearly 700 troops and police officers carried out house-to-house searches in Canto Grande, a shanty-town section of the capital considered to be a Sendero stronghold" (electronic edition).

January 29:  municipal election

Conaghan 2005:  "C90-NM did not field mayoral candidates across the country in the 1993 municipal elections.  It was a sign of its organizational disarray and the government's willingness to gamble that ‘independents' could be co-opted.  That left the field open to traditional parties like APRA and AP and an array of new independent vehicles.  In Lima, Mayor Ricardo Belmont, the maverick television personality turned politician, rejected the opportunity to run for reelection as an ‘oficialista' candidate, but he received the personal endorsement of Fujimori after the C90-NM mayoral candidate withdrew.  Belmont ran a strong race with his independent Movimiento Obras, winning 45 percent of the vote in his own reelection bid while his movement took twenty-one of the forty-two district-level mayoralties in metropolitan Lima" (page 61).

Dietz 1998:  "January 1993" (page 213-216).  Discusses the municipal elections, which are postponed from November 1992.  "Despite the authoritarian nature of Fujimori's actions and the considerable international outcry against them, most of the major parties participated in these elections.  But the most striking development was the emergence of dozens, if not hundreds, of independent candidates, parties, and movements throughout the country" (page 214).

Dietz 2002:  "Belmont ran again in 1993 and was re-elected (Fujimori's candidate had to resign due to his lack of popular support)" (page 201).  "Electoral data reinforce the argument that since the early 1990s, voting in Lima has often become less class based than it had been in earlier years.  For example, in 1993, when Belmont ran for his second term, he won virtually identical levels of support across Lima's districts [gives breakdown], showing that a popular candidate could cut across class lines and that ideology and partisanship had by that time become impediments to winning in Lima" (pages 214-215).

Klarén 2000:  "(T)he traditional parties all participated in the elections, but with mixed results.  In Lima independent Ricardo Belmont easily won reelection as mayor with an impressive 44 percent of the vote in a field of 40 candidates.  His party ‘Obras' swept to victory in most districts in the capital, whereas the Left won only one district and APRA and the PPC garnered only 3 percent and 2 percent of the vote, respectively...Fujimori's party Nueva Mayoría/Cambio 90 fared badly, winning only one municipality" (pages 416-417).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group March 1993:  "Most candidates supporting President Fujimori were defeated in provincial and municipal elections held on 29 January, but substantial gains were made by candidates standing as independents.  Peru's opposition parties made only minor advances and therefore the municipal election result underlines popular disillusionment with Peru's traditional political parties" (page 1123).  Gives additional results.

NotiSur February 9, 1993:  "Despite a wave of rebel violence, nationwide municipal elections took place as scheduled Jan. 29.  The polling turnout was high, and preliminary counts so far show the majority of mayoral and muncipal council seats went to independent candidates...A record number of candidates registered to participate in the municipal elections.  All told, 1,787 mayors will be elected around the country, as well as 10,486 representatives to municipal councils throughout the nation.  Thirty-eight candidates registered for the Lima mayoral contest alone...In addition to the dramatic increase in the number of participating candidates around the country, a second notable trend in these elections was the predominance of independent candidates with no party affiliation.  In the capital, for example, there were 27 independent candidate lists, while the country's political parties presented a total of only 21 lists...The municipal elections were overseen by a contingent of observers from the [OAS]" (electronic edition).

Planas 2000:  "Elecciones municipales de 1993.  Alcaldías provinciales conquistadas por cada agrupación" (page 272).

Rospigliosi 1998:  "Elecciones municipales:  enero de 1993" (page 417-418).  "Perú:  eleccoines municipales del 29 de enero de 1993" (page 439).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  "Elecciones municipales 1993.  Resultado nacional (page 475).  Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."   "Elecciones municipales 1993.   Resultado departamental" (page 476).  Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Elecciones municipales 1993.  Resultado provincial" (pages 477-482).  Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Elecciones municipales 1993.  Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 483-484).  Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." 

Valdés 2000:  "En las elecciones municipales de 1993, de los 39 candidatos para ocupar la alcaldía de Lima, sólo dos eran mujeres" (Anexo:  Participación política de las mujeres en los últimos 20 años:  Perú).


Conaghan 2005:  "Even before the constitutional commission convened, the issue of presidential reelection was on the agenda...Peru's constitutions barred immediate presidential reelection...Despite Fujimori's disavowal of interest in reelection, C90-NM legislators wasted no time in taking up the cause.  Martha Chávez was among the first to step up...In early February 1993, Chávez announced that C90-NM would propose a clause in the new constitution that would allow for immediate presidential reelection and might also include abolishment of any term limits" (page 57).

Keesing's record of world events February 1993:  "The Jan. 29 local elections, whose results were released in early February, confirmed a political trend, when independents, pointedly eschewing ideological stances, were swept into office across the country at the expense of candidates from the pro-government [NM-C-90] coalition and of traditional political parties...As compared with previous elections, the level of political violence was sharply reduced...Observers from the [OAS] were reported to have been satisfied with the electoral process" (electronic edition).  Gives additional details.


Conaghan 2005:  "(T)he new, multipartisan Foro Democrático [is] founded in April 1993 by a diverse group of political and cultural notables" (page 60).  "On April 1, 1993, Congressman Carlos Cuaresma of FIM prepared to introduce a motion calling on the ministry of defense to report to the CCD on the La Cantuta disappearances [of July 18, 1992]...Faced with the explosive charges that military officers were responsible for ten homicides, the CCD had to act" (page 67).  Describes events surrounding these charges and the responses of Fujimori, the military, and the U.S. government (pages 67-68).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  5/4:  "Se funda el Foro Democrático" (page 682).


Conaghan 2005:  "In early May, General Rodolfo Robles went public with information confirming the existence of a death squad, called Grupo Colina...Robles charged that the group operated under direct orders from Vladimiro Montesinos and with the knowledge of General Hermoza...Army officials reacted ferociously" (pages 68-69).


Conaghan 2005:  "The C90-NM majority voted to accept the minority report [on the La Cantuta disappearances] by a margin of thirty-nine to thirteen on June 26.  Just when the case appeared to have hit a dead end, however, another leak of crucial information to the press brought it back to life" (page 70).  Gives details.  "That the La Cantuta case intersected with the constitutional referendum of 1993 complicated matters considerably for the administration" (page 72).  Gives details.

Keesing's record of world events June 1993:  "Amendments to the 1979 Constitution were passed on June 10 by the [CCD]...The amendments allowed for the re-election of an outgoing President, and the restoration of the death penalty for terrorist offences.  Fujimori...had made no secret of his wish for a second consecutive term beyond his 1995 mandate" (electronic edition).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group August 1993:  "A committee of the [CCD] has narrowly approved a clause in the new draft constitution allowing presidential re-election, although a proposal to allow presidents to stand an unlimited number of times was shelved.  The decision enables President Fujimori to stand for a further term in 1995" (page 1183).

NotiSur June 18, 1993:  "A draft of the new constitution has been distributed throughout the country for debate.  Public discussion of the draft is expected to last through the end of June.  The text will then be revised, submitted for approval by a plenary session of the [CCD], and then submitted for public approval in a referendum, tentatively scheduled for August.  However, since late May when the pro-government majority...began circulating the draft, the CCD's constitutional commission has added two major articles.  One would expand application of the death penalty while the other would allow for consecutive presidential reelection" (electronic edition).

NotiSur August 13, 1993:  "In June, the opposition APRA and Movimiento Libertad parties-neither of which is represented in the CCD since they boycotted the November CCD elections-announced their decision to conduct a ‘No' campaign aimed at assuring rejection of the draft constitution in the referendum" (electronic edition).


Burt 2007:  "In July 1993, opposition mayors and congressional leaders, as well as intellectuals, church groups and trade unions, launched a campaign to defeat the constitution.  One of their key demands was a vote on the entire constitution rather than on only partial measures the regime might pick and choose that were more likely to be approved" (page 171).

Conaghan 2005:  "(V)iewed from the presidential palace, the most troubling opposition lay elsewhere, outside of Lima.  In July, the national congress of the mayors' association, Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú (AMPE)...[elected new officials]...Angry with the government's stand against decentralization and the president's control over public spending in the provinces, the mayors passed a declaration...pledging the organization's ‘rejection of the authoritarian and anti-democratic constitutional project.'  They also demanded a referendum on the entire text of the constitution" (page 60). 

Latin American monitor.  Andean group October 1993:  "President Fujimori's 14-member cabinet [resigned] on July 28.  In a move that surprised many, Fujimori accepted all the resignations and took the opportunity to reshuffe his government and bring in new members.  The move consolidates the president's grip on power and highlights his determination to continue dominating Peru's domestic political scene" (page 1207).


Conaghan 2005:  "In a surprise move, the C90-NM congressional majority voted on August 31, 1993, to accept the opposition's call for a referendum on the entire constitution.  Voters would be given the opportunity to cast a Yes or No on the complete text" (page 61).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  26/8:  "El Congreso Constituyente Democrático aprueba la nueva Constitución" (page 683).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group September 1993:  "What particularly concerns the President's political opponents, both right and left, is the claim by Fujimori supporters that since he will be fighting the 1995 election under a new constitution, Fujimori would be free to seek a third five year term at the presidential palace in 2000" (page 1195).

NotiSur August 13, 1993:  "On Aug. 5, the CCD...approved a controversial measure on presidential reelection.  Under the current constitution, presidents are required to sit out a full five-year term following the end of their first term in office.  The new measure will allow future presidents-as well as current President Alberto Fujimori-to run for two consecutive terms in office.  After two consecutive terms, a president would then have to sit out a five year term before running again.  The measure was approved in a 51 to 24 vote, with five abstentions...Legislators hope to have the full draft done by mid-August.  Once the full text has been voted on in a plenary session of the CCD, legislators will begin debate on the process of submitting the draft to a referendum.  Under the current government timetable, the plebiscite must be held before the end of September.  Deputies in the CCD must decide whether to submit the entire constitution to a simple ‘Yes' or ‘No' referendum, or to only have the most controversial articles subject to the popular vote" (electronic edition).


Conaghan 2005:  "The No campaign began in earnest with the formation of the Comité Cívico por el No (Civic Committee for No) in early September...Legislators in the CCD opted to form their own Comando Unitario to campaign for the No vote" (page 61).  "(T)he No campaign unfolded as a grassroots effort that joined popular organizations and party activists and Peru's major trade unions.  Fujimori's view of the opposition was simple...Branding opposition politicians as the ‘living dead,' Fujimori accused them of trying to destabilize the country and provoke a military intervention.  Scare tactics were an important element in the Yes campaign...But the Yes campaign was not exclusively negative in its appeals" (page 62).  Gives details of both campaigns (page 62-64).

NotiSur September 3, 1993:  "On Sept. 1...the CCD voted in favor of submitting the entire constitutional text to a ‘Yes' or ‘No' referendum.  The vote will be held sometime between Oct. 26 and Nov. 26...Opposition parties have announced intentions to conduct a ‘No' campaign" (electronic edition).

October 31:  referendum on constitution

Brysk 2000:  "The 1993 constitution, revised after [Fujimori's] consolidation of power, removed the traditional guarantees of inalienability of indigenous lands, despite a petition with 55,000 signatures presented by indigenous groups opposed to the reform" (page 269).

Conaghan 2000:  "The entire opposition united to oppose the approval of the Fujimori-backed constitution in the national referendum held on October 31, 1993. The PPC and AP joined leftist parties and APRA in campaigning for a ‘no' vote on the constitution.  Perhaps more important than the party opposition per se, however, was the ‘no' movement developed by grassroots organizations...Fujimori squeezed out a victory on the referendum but with an uncomfortably thin margin and election conditions that raised questions about the validity of the results.  The ‘yes' vote accounted for 52.3 percent of the valid vote; the ‘no' vote won 47.7 percent" (page 268).

García Montero 2001:  "Resultados del referéndum constitucional del 31 de octubre de 1993" (page 473).

Historia cronológica del Perú 2006:  31/10:  "Se realiza un referéndum para consultar a la población si aprueba o no las reformas hechas a la Constitución; una de ellas, la reelección presidencial" (page 683).

Klarén 2000:  "Calling for a straight yes-or-no vote by the public, the plebiscite on the new charter won approval by a 52 percent to 48 percent vote.  This was a surprisingly close result, certainly not the 70-30 percent approval rating predicted by the president.  The government won in Lima but lost in the provinces" (page 417).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group October 1993:   "Peru's population will vote on the country's draft constitution on October 31.  The referendum will be a yes-no vote covering the entire 226-article text rather than a vote on just the controversial themes such as presidential re-election, establishing the death penalty for terrorist offense, reducing the legislature to one house and government decentralisation...If the referendum is passed, which all recent opinion polls indicate is likely, it wil open the way for Fujimori to stand for re-election in 1995.  Peru's main traditional parties, from both the left and right of the political spectrum, have united to try to prevent the constitution's approval" (page 1207).

Latin American monitor.  Andean group December 1993:  "The closeness of the result shows that President Fujimori's economic policies are far less popular than his authoritarian stance towards terrorist groups and Peru's traditional political parties...The size of the ‘no' vote has given some encouragement to Peru's traditional political parties, APRA and Acción Popular, which have boycotted the constituent assembly" (page 1231).

NotiSur October 29, 1993:  "Fujimori has portrayed the referendum as a vote of confidence in his government, and has announced that a victory by those voters casting ‘No' ballots would constitute a ‘national disaster...Fujimori said he would submit his resignation if the measure goes down to defeat...Under the electoral ground rules, only a simple majority is necessary for the initiative to pass.  A group of 30 observers from the [OAS], along with one observer from Japan, will monitor the voting" (electronic edition).

Palmer 2000:  "The new Constitution was narrowly approved (52-48 percent) by a referendum in October 1993.  It recentralized government authority...and allowed for the immediate reelection of the sitting president.  As the ‘autogolpe' worked out, then, Fujimori was very much the winner" (page 242).

Philip 2003:   "By the time that the new constitution was subject to referendum, in October 1993, Peru's semi-authoritarianism was starting to record some genuine policy achievements.  Inflation had fallen, Sendero Luminoso had declined and economic growth was resuming" (page 169).

Rospigliosi 1998:  "El referéndum constitucional" (pages 419-421).  "Perú:  referéndum octubre 31, 1993" (page 442).

Tuesta Soldevilla 2001:  Referéndum 1993.  Resultado nacional" (page 468).  Gives vote for each option, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos."   "Referéndum 1993.  Resultado departamental" (page 468).  Gives by department the percentage of vote for each option, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Referéndum 1993.  Resultado provincial" (pages 469-473).  Gives by province the percentage of vote for each option, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."  "Referéndum 1993.  Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 474).  Gives by district the percentage of vote for each option, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." 


Conaghan 2005:  "As the wait for the official results went on, the magnitude of the government's defeat outside of Lima became clear.  Ten of Peru's sixteen departments opted for the No vote.  Of the six departments voting Yes, two were Lima and Callao.  The concentration of the Yes vote in the metropolitan Lima area made opposition leaders suspicious of the ongoing vote-counting in Lima by the Jurado Departamental de Elecciones de Lima (JDEL)...The JDEL's decision to count ‘actas' (documents recording the votes cast at each polling place) that were signed by only two polling officials (rather than the obligatory three) was interpreted by the opposition as a way of ensuring a government victory in the tight race.  The opposition lodged legal challenges to 3,200 ‘actas' in Lima, but unsurprisingly JDEL rejected the challenges.  The OAS election mission paid little attention to the opposition's complaints about the Lima vote count" (pages 64-65).

Fleet 1997:  "A strong presidential constitution permitting the president's reelection was approved in November 1993, although by a narrower margin than most observers predicted" (page 251).

Keesing's record of world events November 1993:  "The official results of the constitutional referendum held on Oct. 31 were released on Nov. 9.   The government's margin of victory, in the region of 5 per cent, was much narrower than it had expected.  While the vote had been almost two-thirds in favour in Lima, over half of the departments had rejected it" (electronic edition).

NotiSur November 5, 1993:  "(W)ith the official vote count still not complete, on Nov. 4 the [JNE] said preliminary results suggested a race too tight to call on the basis of projections" (electronic edition).


Conaghan 2005:  "The OAS mission offered no observations about why the JNE waited until December 17 to confirm the final results of the referendum, nor did it directly address the fraud accusations made by the one dissenting member of the JNE...Absent any serious criticisms from the OAS mission, opposition leaders glumly concluded that there was little hope of challenging the results.  Still, the narrow margin of victory reduced the utility of the new constitution as a means to relegitimize the regime...Fujimori went ahead and signed the constitution on December 29, 1993" (page 65).  "In a press conference called before the ceremony, CCD opposition leaders characterized the new constitution as ‘illegitimate' and presented an alternative text for a constitution" (page 66).  "Fujimori made it clear how limited the concessions in the La Cantuta case would be in December 1993 when he reconfirmed, rather than replaced, General Hermoza as head of the armed forces high command" (page 72).

Davila Puño 2005:  "El artículo 89° de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993, al referirse tanto a las comunidades campesinas como a las nativas como personas jurídicas y, por lo tanto, con existencia legal, introduce un concepto importante para los pueblos indígenas:  la autonomía" (page 12).

Del Campo 2008:  "La Constitución peruana de 1993 no sólo modifica la estructura bicameral del Parlamento a uno bicameral, sino que reduce también ostensiblemente el número de parlamentarios de 240 a 120" (page 146).

García Montero 2001:  "(L)a Constitución de 1993, aprobada por un Congreso elegido sin la participación de amplios sectores de la clase política y que contó con una mayoría a favor de Fujimori, eliminó el Senado y el Poder Legislativo pasó a ser unicameral; reforzó los poderes del Ejecutivo con relación al Legislativo y el Poder Judicial; permitió la reelección presidencial inmediata; redujo los poderes del Congreso unicameral para cuestionar la responsabilidad de los altos mandos militares y aumentó los poderes de la Policía y el Ejército en los procesos judiciales.  El sistema electoral conformado impuso una barrera de entrada significativa para cualquier candidato o partido político.  Para participar, un partido debía haber recolectado una cantidad de firmas de adhesión equivalente al 4% del voto válido de las elecciones anteriores" (page 412).

Keesing's record of world events December 1993:  "On Dec. 29 President Alberto Keinya Fujimori formally promulgated the new Constitution approved in October's referendum...Former President Alan García Pérez resigned from the [APRA] party on Dec. 25" (electronic edition).

NotiSur December 17, 1993:  "On Dec. 11, the [JNE] issued official results from the Oct. 31 national referendum...According to the JNE report, the constitution was approved by a narrow margin, with the ‘Yes' ballots accounting for 52.24% of the valid votes, and the ‘No' ballots totalling 47.75%.  A total of 8.9 million Peruvians voted, although nearly 12 million people were registered to vote.  The JNE reported that 8.3% of the ballots cast were rejected because they were submitted in blank, or because they were deliberately or involuntarily destroyed.  The ‘Yes' vote was strongest in metropolitan Lima, where approximately one-third of the country's population is concentrated.  In contrast, the ‘No' vote won a majority in 14 of the country's 25 departments" (electronic edition).  Describes irregularities in the voting.

NotiSur January 14, 1994:  "President Alberto Fujimori formally promulgated the nation's 12th constitution on Dec. 29.  The 226-article Magna Carta was put into effect on Dec. 31...The new constitution clears the way for a possible reelection bid by Fujimori" (electronic edition).

Tanaka 2006:   "According to Article 179 of the 1993 Constitution, the JNE is made up of five members:  one elected by the Supreme Court from among its retired and active justices; one elected by the Board of Supreme Prosecutors from among retired and active supreme prosecutors; one elected by the Bar Association of Lima from among its members; one elected by the deans of the faculties of public universities from among their former deans; and one elected by the deans of the law faculties of private universities from among their former deans" (page 65).